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ENFORCING LAWYERS' COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE
Glenn S. Draper
Abstract: Courts uphold most post-employment covenants not to compete if they meet a
three part reasonableness test that balances the interests of the employer, the employee, and
the public. Lawyers' covenants not to compete, however, are treated differently. Courts hold
lawyers' agreements that prohibit competition with their former firms per se invalid, in order
to preserve clients' unrestricted freedom to choose their attorneys. Courts have split on
whether to apply the per se rule to invalidate lawyers' agreements that discourage rather than
prohibit post-employment competition. The California Supreme Court's recent decision in
Howard v. Babcock, applying the familiar reasonableness test to a lawyer's agreement
discouraging post-employment competition, is sure to add to the controversy. This Comment
critically analyzes the application of the per se rule to covenants that discourage rather than
prohibit attorneys from competing with their former firms. The Comment concludes that the
reasonableness test applied to restrictive covenants in other professions adequately protects
client choice while giving consideration to firm interests and should apply to lawyers'
covenants not to compete.
Richard Cohen headed the tax department at the venerable firm of
Lord, Day & Lord.' After 20 years, Cohen crossed Wall Street to join
the equally venerable Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, taking
several clients with him. Understandably perturbed, Cohen's former
partners declined to pay certain sums due him under the partnership
agreement, citing a clause that limited payments to withdrawing partners
who compete with their former firm. Cohen sued, claiming the clause in
question violated ethical rules governing attorneys.2 Ironically, the
partnership agreement at Cohen's new firm contained a similar restrictive
covenant. Furthermore, Cohen had previously benefited from
application of the restrictive covenant to other Lord, Day & Lord
partners upon their withdrawal. Apparently, Cohen even had
participated in drafting the very clause he now sought to invalidate.
Nevertheless, Cohen won his suit, illustrating an unusual quirk in the
ethical rules governing attorneys: Sometimes lawyers' ethics compel
them not to keep agreements they sign
1. The facts in the introduction are from Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y.
1989), as stated in Steven Brill, The Partnership Breakup Follies, Am. Law., Mar. 1988, at 3.
2. See Model Rules Of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 (1992); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-108(A) (1969).
3. Gail Diane Cox, Defect at Your Own Risk; Nat'l LJ., Oct. 14, 1991, at 13 (paraphrasing Don
Howarth, attorney for Haight, Brown & Bonesteel in Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court,
285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
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Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 and Disciplinary Rule 2-
108(A) prohibit restrictive covenants between attorneys. Unlike such
agreements made by professionals in other fields, courts hold attorneys'
restrictive covenants per se invalid. Part I of this Comment looks at the
applicability of these rules to contract actions and. then examines the
related question of the enforceability of agreements that merely
discourage rather than prohibit competition. Part II analyzes the per se
rule and its effect on law firms and attorneys. Part III concludes that the
rule of reasonableness applicable to restrictive covenants in other
professions should apply to lawyers.
I. COURTS EMPLOY THE PER SE RULE TO INVALIDATE
LAWYERS' COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. Most Restrictive Covenants Are Subject to the Reasonableness Test
Restrictive covenants may be appurtenant to contracts involving the
sale of a business or to employment or partnership agreements.' When
businesses are sold, the sellers may promise to refrain from competition
in order to protect the value of the goodwill acquired by the purchasers.'
In the context of employment or partnership agreements, anti-
competitive clauses protect employers' customer relationships and
confidential information.6 Restrictive covenants have negative effects as
well. Covenants not to compete can prevent individuals from supporting
themselves and their families.' Furthermore, post-employment restraints
may harm the public if they operate to create a monopoly.
8
Courts analyze most post-employment covenants not to compete
under a reasonableness test, balancing the interests of employers,
employees, and the public. A restrictive covenant will be found
unreasonable if it (1) is broader than necessary to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer,9 (2) imposes an undue burden on the
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(2) (1981).
5. Id. cmt. f.
6. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 654 (1960).
7. Id. at 685-86.
8. Id. at 687. Surprisingly, enforcement of these covenants is uniformly governed by common
law rather than federal antitrust law. Harvey J. Goldschnid, Antitnst's Neglected Stepchild: A
Proposalfor Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Lav, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1193
(1973). This may be because federal antitrust law has been interp-eted to prohibit only those
restrictive covenants already invalid under state law. Id. at 1204-06.
9. See Mantek Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702,711 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
a provision prohibiting salesmen from selling competing products in their former territories is
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employee," or (3) tends to create a monopoly or restrict production.1
Courts apply the reasonableness test to covenants restricting the practice
of doctors, 2 dentists, 3 veterinarians, 4 and other professionals."
B. Lawyers' Restrictive Covenants Are Per Se Invalid
Lawyers, however, are treated differently. Both Model Rule of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) 5.616 and Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-
108(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (MCPR) 7
prohibit lawyers from entering into agreements that restrict their right to
practice after termination of a relationship with a firm.'8 These rules
were adopted primarily to prevent lawyers from signing agreements that
restrict clients' freedom to select their attorneys."
unnecessary to protect employer's interests; only a prohibition on calling former customers is
reasonable).
10. See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1201, 1210
(D.N.H. 1991) (holding that a covenant not to compete that prohibited employees from working for
competing magnetic fluid manufacturers for five years is an undue burden on employees), aff'd, 968
F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992).
11. See Dow v. Gotch, 201 N.W. 655, 657 (Neb. 1924) (upholding beautician's covenant not to
compete as not tending to create a monopoly when city "ha[s beauty parlors a plenty, a number of
them!).
12. Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978).
13. Olson v. Hillside Dental, Ltd., 371 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
14. See Kaeser v. Adamson, No. CA-800 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1984) (LEXIS, States Library,
Ohio file).
15. See, e.g., Mailman, Ross, Toyes, & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1982). See generally Samuel Williston, Wl1liston on Contracts § 1639 (3d ed. 1972).
16. MRPC 5.6, in relevant portion, reads:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement ....
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 (1992).
17. DR 2-108(A) reads: "A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after
the termination of a relationship created by the agreement.. Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-108(A) (1969).
18. Every state except California has adopted ethical rules based on the MRPC or the MCPR. See
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 56, 62 (1986). California is governed by the California
Rules of Professional Ethics. Id. at 64. The provisions regarding lawyers' restrictive covenants are
nearly identical in each state and it is unimportant for the purposes of this Comment which system a
state has adopted.
19. 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 824 (2d. ed. Supp.
1992). The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics originally opposed lawyers' covenants not to
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Ethical codes, however, are not law.2" Both the MCPR and the MRPC
disclaim any attempt to govern civil actions.21 Violations of these rules
may give rise to professional discipline, but are not by themselves a basis
for civil liability.22 Thus, in an action by a law fixm or an attorney to
enforce a covenant not to compete, the ethical codes are not directly
controlling.
Nevertheless, courts may look to the codes fbr guidance, and to
provide a remedy if appropriate to the nature of the violation. 3 Most
courts have concluded that the public policy embodied in MRPC 5.6 and
DR 2-108(A), the right of clients to unrestricted choice of counsel, is
furthered by invalidating partnership or employment agreements that
conflict with the rules. 4 These courts have develo-ped the per se rule of
invalidity: Unlike restrictive covenants in other professions, which are
compete because they smacked of commercialism. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op.
300 (1961). To the committee, agreeing to restrictive covenants was alin to bartering in clients, and
was inconsistent with a lawyer's professional status. Id. Furthermore, the committee believed
lawyers' restrictive covenants were unnecessary because attorneys were already prohibited from
soliciting the clients of their former firms. Id. Lawyers today have much more freedom to pursue
clients than in 1961. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983) (allowing
attorneys to solicit clients with whom they have a prior professional relationship). By the time the
ABA adopted DR 2-108(A) in 1969, the rationale for prohibiting attorneys' covenants not to
compete had changed from preventing "bartering" of clients to preserving clients' freedom to choose
their attorneys. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1072 (1968)
(reasoning that an attorney must "be available to prospective clients who might desire to engage his
services").
20. Courts and legislatures adopted the codes to "authoritatively mcasur[e] a lawyer's liability to
professional discipline." See Wolfram, supra note 18, at 51.
21. The Model Code does not "undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct." Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1969).
The Model Rules provide in part:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption
that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and
to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just
basis for a lawyer's self assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction
has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Scope (1983).
22. Wolfraim, supra note 18, at 51.
23. Id. at 52.
24. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413 (N.Y. 1989); accord Jacob v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 155 (N.J. 1992); Hagan v. O*Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C.,
683 P.2d 563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528,
531 (Tenn. 1991).
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upheld if reasonable, lawyers' covenants not to compete are per se
invalid as contrary to public policy.2s No attempt is made to balance the
interests of concerned parties.26
Dwyer v. Jung,27 a New Jersey case decided in 1975, relied on DR 2-
108(A) to find that lawyers' restrictive covenants were per se illegal and
against the public interest. The court refused to enforce a provision in a
partnership agreement that prohibited partners from representing a client
designated as that of another partner for five years after the dissolution of
the firm.28 The court excluded restrictive covenants between lawyers
from the general category of agreements restricting post-employment
competition.29 Instead of the reasonableness test, the court adopted the
per se rule because of the special nature of the attorney-client
relationship." The court believed that "[tlhe attorney-client relationship
is consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he may do
nothing which restricts the right of a client to repose confidence in any
counsel of his choice."'" Quoting DR 2-108(A), the court held that an
agreement effectively restricting the right of clients to counsel of their
choice was per se invalid as against public policy.
32
Karlin v. Weinberg,33 another New Jersey case decided shortly after
Dwyer, limited the application of the per se rule to attorneys' restrictive
covenants. The trial court, relying on Dwyer, held that restrictive
25. Older sources do not distinguish attorneys from other professionals. See Blake, supra note 6,
at 662 ("Restraints upon professional employees, such as associates or technical assistants of
lawyers, doctors, architects, accountants and dentists are also generally upheld ...." (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)). The Restatement (First) of Contracts contains the following illustration,
applying the usual reasonableness test to a restrictive covenant between attorneys:
A, a lawyer, employs B, a young lawyer, as his clerk, who, as part of the bargain covenants
not to engage in the practice of law within the State after the termination of the employment.
Although A's practice extends throughout the State, the covenant is illegal, since it imposes
undue hardship upon B.
Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 515 Illus. 5 (1932).
26. See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 586 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1992)
(invalidating a restrictive covenant intended to assure repayment of a $4.5 million loan to the
partnership).
27. 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
28. Id. at 499.
29. Id.
30. See Id. at 500; see also Robert L. Schonfeld, Note, Attorneys Must Not Enter Into Partnership
Agreements Prohibiting Themselves from Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the
Partnership, 4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 195, 202 (1975).
31. Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500.
32. Id. at 501.
33. 372 A.2d 616 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978).
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covenants between doctors were per se invalid because they infiinged on
a patient's choice of physicians.3 4 The appellate court reversed, citing
the Principals of Medical Ethics published by the American Medical
Association (AMA).3" The court refused to apply Dwyer to doctors
because, unlike the ABA, the AMA had no ethical restrictions on
enforcing restrictive covenants.36 The court applied the reasonableness
test, and upheld the agreement.37
C. Courts May Permit Agreements Discouraging Competition Under
the Per Se Rule
Although some scholars have criticized the prohibition on attorneys'
restrictive covenants, 8 no court has upheld enforcement of an absolute
prohibition on competition since the MCPR was adopted.39 Some firms'
partnership or employment agreements, however, use burdensome
financial conditions to discourage rather than prohibit competition from
attorneys who leave the firm.4" There are two types of agreements
discouraging competition. Each withholds some benefit from the
departing attorney if the attorney competes with the firm or continues to
serve firm clients. Courts have split on whether agreements discouraging
competition are per se invalid.
1. Forfeiture-For-Competition Restrictions
The first type of agreement discouraging competition is a forfeiture-
for-competition clause. When an attorney leaves a firm, the partnership
or employment agreement usually provides terms for reimbursement of
34. Id. at 618-19.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 619.
38. For an excellent and thorough discussion of some of the problems inherent in the prohibition,
see Kirstan Penasack, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm Agreements Anticipating
Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 889 (1992). See generally Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not To Compete and
the Legal Profession, 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 423 (1985); Schonfeld, supra note 30.
39. Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61
Temp. L. Rev. 1055, 1073-74 (1988).
40. Robert W. Hillman points out that language like "departing" or "leaving" contains significant
value judgments about the rights of attorneys and firms competing for clients. "The idea that a
partner 'leaves' while others 'stay' tips the analysis towards a view that the partner 'taking' clients
is, in effect, looting the firm." Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Breakups 6-7 (1990).
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the attorney's capital contribution and payment of uncollected salary or
other earnings.41 Frequently these agreements also provide compensation
for accounts receivable (hours billed but not yet paid by clients) and
work in progress (hours worked but not yet billed).42 A forfeiture-for-
competition clause, like that in the partnership agreement between
Richard Cohen and Lord, Day & Lord, reduces this departure
compensation when an attorney leaves but continues to practice in
competition with the firm.4" A majority of courts invalidate these
agreements as per se against public policy because, like restrictive
covenants that prohibit competition, forfeiture-for-competition clauses
may operate to restrict a client's choice of attorney.
Gray v. Martin is the leading case holding a forfeiture-for-
competition clause unenforceable. In Gray, the partnership agreement
provided that a withdrawing partner would receive the balance due on
any unpaid draws, reimbursement for the partner's capital contribution,
and continuing compensation in an amount equal to one half the
partner's annual draw, to be paid over two years.45 The agreement
further provided that the withdrawing partner would relinquish any right
to the continuing compensation if he or she continued to practice in the
geographic vicinity of the firm.46 The court found that DR 2-108(A)
prohibited this provision, even though the provision did not technically
prevent the departing attorney from practicing in the area.47 Any
agreement that requires an attorney to relinquish benefits that are
otherwise due, the court reasoned, may dissuade the attorney from
representing former clients.48 Such an agreement necessarily affects the
right of a lawyer to practice, violating the public interest protected by DR
2-108(A).
49
41. Chuck Santangelo & Gerry Malone, Partnership Agreements: Don't Dance Around the
Issues, Trial, Apr. 1988, at 58.
42. Id.
43. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,410-11 (N.Y. 1989).
44. 663 P.2d 1285 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).




49. Id. Although phrased in terms of protecting the right of an attorney to practice, the court
indicated that "[the purpose of the rule is to govern the relationships between attorneys for the
protection of the public." Id. The court explained in a later case that agreements discouraging
competition are "contrary to the public policy of making legal counsel available, insofar as possible,
according to the wishes of a client." Hagan v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d 563, 565
(Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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Not all courts agree, however, that forfeiture-for-competition clauses
are necessarily contrary to the public interest. In Howard v. Babcock,0
for example, the California Supreme Court recently refused to invalidate
a forfeiture-for-competition clause that deprived departing partners of all
withdrawal benefits other than return of their capital contributions.5 The
Court first noted that the California Business and Professional Code
section 16602, which authorizes non-compete clauses in partnership
agreements, did not contain an exception for lawyers." The Court
explained that, while it had the authority to impose a higher standard of
conduct on lawyers, it would not do so in this context, concluding that an
agreement among law partners imposing a reasonable cost on departing
partners who compete with the firm was not inconsistent with the
California Rules of Professional Conduct nor contrary to public policy.53
The Court held that "a partner's agreement to pay former partners, or to
forego payments otherwise due under the contract, in an amount that at
the time of the agreement is reasonably calculated to compensate the firm
for losses that may be caused by the with drawing [sic] partner's
competition with the firm, may be permitted."54
2. Client-Based Restrictions
Some law firms also use client-based restrictions io discourage
departing attorneys from competing with their former firms. These
agreements reduce the attorney's departure compensation by some
amount for each client who elects to follow the departing attorney, or
provide that fees received from specific clients must be shared with the
attorney's former partners." In In Re Silverberg,6 the New York
50. 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006 (Dec. 6, 1993); accord Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court,
285 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
51. Howard, 1993 Cal. LEXIS at *2.
52. Id. at *13-14. The Court's conclusion on this issue was buttretsed by its recognition that "a
revolution in the practice of law has occurred requiring economic interests of the law firm to be
protected as they are in other business enterprises." Id. at *19. Tle Court was referring to the
flourishing practice of lateral hiring, where increasingly mobile lawyers change firms bringing
revenue-producing clients with them. Id. at *21-22; see generally Hillman, supra note 40, at 1-7.
The Court went on to explain that "we are confident that our recognition of a new reality in the
practice of law will have no deleterious effect on the current ability of clients to retain loyal,
competent counsel of their choice." Id. at *19-20.
53. Id. at *16, *32. California Rule of Professional Conduct 1-500 is substantially similar to
MRPC 5.6 and DR 2-108(A). Id. at *16, n. 5. Seesupra note 18.
54. Id. at *33.
55. Terry, supra note 39, at 1076.
56. 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1980).
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Supreme Court, Appellate Division rejected client-based restrictions. In
that case, the partnership agreement provided that, upon dissolution, a
party who represented a client brought to the firm by his partner would
turn over 80 percent of the fees generated by that client for a period of
eighteen months." Citing DR 2-108(A) and ABA opinion 300, the court
determined that the clause amounted to a restrictive covenant, and was
void as a violation of the public policy against trafficking in clients.
D. Attempts To Accommodate Firm Interests Under the Per Se Rule
Although courts have generally refused to enforce contracts
containing financial disincentives to competition, lawyers continue to
sign and attempt to enforce these agreements. 9 Firms and attorneys,
after all, have significant financial interests at stake.60 Courts are aware
of those interests, and some have suggested ways to accommodate them
under the per se rule.
The court in Cohen, for instance, while invalidating a forfeiture-for-
competition clause in the Lord, Day & Lord partnership agreement,
expressly declined to decide whether an agreement that called for
forfeiture of unearned income would be similarly invalid.61 The court
reasoned that "[w]hile a law firm has a legitimate interest in its own
survival and economic well being and in maintaining its clients, it cannot
protect those interests by contracting for the forfeiture of [a departing
partner's] earned revenues. 62 The court left open the possibility that a
firm might provide additional, unearned compensation to partners who
leave for academia or to accept government positions, but deny that
compensation to partners who join competing firms.
Other courts have also recognized firm interests while applying the
per se rule. In Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus,63 the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the Cohen distinction. The important question,
according to the New Jersey court, is not the nature of the departure
57. Id. at 481-82.
58. Id.
59. An unscientific survey of the partnership agreements at twenty New York firms found that
about half contained restrictive covenants. Brill, supra note 1, at 3; see also Santangelo & Malone,
supra note 41, at 58 (recommending that lawyers' partnership agreements contain non-compete
clauses and penalties for violating them).
60. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, at 824.1.
61. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,413 (N.Y. 1989).
62. Id.
63. 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
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compensation but instead the agreement's effect on clients.64 The Jacob
court said any provision that may dissuade an attorney from representing
a specific client violates MRPC 5.6 and is invalid under the per se rule.65
The court also concluded that, although both pzrties were guilty of
violating New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6, equitable
considerations did not bar the departing partners from receiving their
66departure compensation. The court admitted that awarding the
departing attorneys their departure compensation would give them an
unbargained-for windfall, but believed that such an outcome best served
the public interest.67
The court recognized the detrimental effe-,t that a lawyer's
competitive departure might have on his or her firm, however. The court
indicated it would approve a provision that deducted a firm's actual loss
of goodwill from the lawyer's departure compensation, explaining that:
if a partner's departure will result in a decrease in the probability of
a client's return and a consequent decrease in prospective earnings,
that departure may decrease the value of the firm's goodwill. It
would not be inappropriate therefore for law partners to take that
specific effect into account in determining the shares due a
departing partner.68
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals in Hagan v. O'Connell,
Goyak & Ball, P.C.69 approved a provision that tied a reduction in
departure compensation to the actual losses suffered by the firm.7" The
shareholders' agreement in Hagan contained a client-based restriction
that reduced the price of the departing attorney's shares by one half the
annual gross billings of any client who elected to follow the attorney.7'
The court refused to invalidate this clause because it believed the price
reduction based on client billings bore a rational relationship to the loss
suffered by the firm.72 The shareholders' agreement also contained a
64. Id. at 150.
65. Id. at 147-48 (rejecting an agreement that deprived departing partners "of additional
compensation unrelated to their vested interest" because they com'iete with the firm after their
departure).
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 683 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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forfeiture-for-competition clause that reduced the buy-out price of a
departing lawyer by 40 percent if the lawyer continued to compete with
the firm after his or her departure.73 As in Gray and Cohen, the court
held this provision of the shareholders' agreement invalid as contrary to
public policy because it impinged on client choice.74 Unlike the
reduction in departure compensation based on client billings, the 40
percent reduction for competition was not based on the firm's actual
losses.
II. COURTS SHOULD ABANDON THE PER SE RULE
Most courts hold that attorneys' employment or partnership
agreements that bar post-employment competition are per se void as
against public policy. The courts' reasoning is flawed in three respects.
First, such covenants do not injure the public. Second, the per se rule
inadequately protects the interests of firms and violates principles of
contract law. Finally, courts seem to apply the per se rule in name only,
approving agreements that are indistinguishable from reasonable
covenants not to compete. Firms have also found ways to circumvent
the rule. Rather than continue to apply the per se rule, courts should
analyze lawyers' covenants not to compete under the reasonableness test
applicable to anti-competitive covenants in all other professions.
A. Attorneys' Restrictive Covenants Are Not Unduly Injurious to the
Public
When a court strikes down a restrictive covenant between attorneys, it
is stating that the covenant in some way injures the public.75 Courts have
found lawyers' restrictive covenants injurious to the public because the
agreements limit competition among attorneys, and restrict clients' free
choice of counsel. Courts have failed, however, to distinguish lawyering




75. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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1. Courts Have Failed To Distinguish Lawyering.from Other
Professions
Some courts have justified the per se rule as necessary to protect the
"consensual, highly fiduciary" nature of the attorney-.client relationship.76
Courts routinely uphold restrictive covenants in other professions with
similar client-provider relationships, however. The doctor-patient
relationship, for example, is similarly "confidential and intimate."
7
Accountants, likewise, receive personal and confidential information
from clients during the course of their professional relations. 8  In
comparing accountants to lawyers, a New Jersey court concluded that
"[like the lawyer-client relationship characteri2ed in Dwyer, the
accountant-client relationship is also consensual and fiduciary, and the
right of the client to repose confidence in the acceuntant of his or her
choice should not readily be circumscribed."79 Yet, this court found the
reasonableness test perfectly adequate to protect the public interest in
being able to choose among accountants. 0  Lawyers, doctors, and
accountants all provide services that are highly personal in nature."
Courts have concluded that covenants not to compete between doctors or
accountants are not unduly injurious to the public, and have permitted
them if reasonable. 2 Lawyers' covenants not to compete should likewise
be allowed.
76. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
77. Howard v. Babcock, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006, at *31 (Dec. 6, 1993); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d
1307, 1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (Butler, J., dissenting) (arguing for application of the per se rule to
doctors); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1171 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ("Both [the
doctor-patient and lawyer-client] relationships are consensual, highly fiduciary and dependent on the
patient's or client's trust and confidence in the physician consulted or attorney retained.").
78. Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 444 A.2d 75, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982);
Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606,252 P. 115, 116 (1927).
79. Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro, 444 A.2d at 80.
80. Id.
81. Hillman, supra note 40, at 29 ("The reasons for distinguishing lawyering from other
professions in this context are vague, and it is questionable whether the availability of choice for the
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2. Promoting Competition Among Attorneys Is an Insufficient
Justification for the Per Se Rule
Some commentators support the per se rule because it promotes
competition among attorneys.83 When an attorney leaves a firm, he or
she may engage in a bidding war for certain valued clients."
Consequently, the client may benefit from lower fees." There are
several reasons, however, why promoting competition proves an
inadequate justification for the per se rule. First, the reason a departing
attorney is able to compete effectively for former clients is that the
attorney was exposed to confidential client information during the
employment relationship.86  The benefit from this confidential
information, however, belongs to the firm and not the individual
attorney.87  Second, there are over 700,000 attorneys in the United
States.88 The fact that a particular attorney is unable to compete for a
client's business will have very little effect on that client's ability to find
suitable representation.89  Finally, although reasonable restrictive
covenants are anti-competitive, courts tolerate them in every other
profession." Promoting competition among attorneys cannot justify the
per se rule because it does not explain why lawyers should be treated as
sui generis.
3. Promoting Client Choice Is an Insufficient Justification for the Per
Se Rule
A final rationale for the per se rule is that enforcing attorneys'
covenants not to compete restricts clients' choice of attorneys.9" The
relationship between attorney and client is a highly personal one.9' The
client's confidence in the attorney is a vital factor in the attorney's ability
83. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, at 824.4-824.5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
87. Kalish, supra note 38, at 444.
88. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 275
(1988).
89. See Kalish, supra note 38, at 452.
90. Hillman, supra note 40, at 29.
91. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
92. See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Partnerships: The
No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1985).
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to provide effective legal services. Protecting client choice is an
important value served by the ethical rules governing attorneys.
Client choice is not paramount, however. The principle of client
choice gives way to other interests in a variety of situations. Ethical
rules, for instance, do not obligate lawyers to accept every client who
wishes to employ them.93 Conflict of interest rules may also restrict a
client's right to counsel of his or her choice.9' MRPC 1.16 permits an
attorney to withdraw from representing a client for non-payment of fees
or when the representation creates an unreasonable financial burden,
even if the withdrawal materially adversely affects the client.95
Finally, the ethical codes at times actually require a client's choice of
attorney to be restricted. MRPC 1.17 prohibits the seller of a law
practice from competing with the purchaser, implying in the sale of every
law firm a promise by the seller not to practice in the same geographic
vicinity as the firm." Although clients are, of course, free to terminate
the relationship with the purchaser of the firm at any time, MRPC 1.17
mandates that their former attorney be unavailable to them. The harm to
the client in that instance is indistinguishable from the harm caused by a
similar covenant contained in an employment or partnership agreement.97
Yet, courts forbid a client's choice of attorney to be bargained away in
the latter situation, but the ethical codes require it in the former. The
Model Rules explain that the purchaser of a practice must receive the
goodwill he or she bargains for.9" The Model Rules therefore elevate the
need to preserve the value of a firm's goodwill over the client's right to
choose. Rule 1.17 illustrates that while client choice is an important
value, it is not necessarily superior to other interests.
The public interest in unfettered competition among attorneys is no
greater than the public interest in unfettered competition in many
professions. The public interest in freedom to choose one's attorney, for
93. The Ethical Considerations of the CPR, however, suggest that "in furtherance of the objective
of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered
employment." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-26 (1969).
94. Center For Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rule.,! of Professional Conduct 177
(2d ed. 1992) ("Courts have recognized that the ethical consicerations underlying imputed
disqualification must be balanced with the right to one's free choice of counsel.").
95. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b)(1992). Subsection (d) requires a
withdrawing attorney to take steps to minimize the effect of the withdrawal on the client. Id.
96. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.17 (1992).
97. When a partner leaves a firm, the remaining partners repurchas - his or her share of the firm's
equity. MRPC 1.17, however, applies only when the entire practice is sold. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.17(b) (1992).
98. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, at 824 n.l.
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example, is surely no more significant than the public interest in
choosing one's doctor. Attorneys' covenants not to compete are no more
injurious to the public than those between other professionals.
Therefore, courts should abandon the per se rule which applies solely to
attorneys' covenants not to compete in favor of the reasonableness rule
applicable to all other professions.
B. Application of the Per Se Rule Fails To Adequately Protect Firms'
Interests
In contrast to the minimal public interest in the enforcement of the per
se rule, the harm to law firms from enforcement of the rule is significant.
First, application of the per se rule results in the forfeiture of law firms'
property interest in goodwill. Second, the per se rule contravenes the
principle of in pan delicto by penalizing law firms while affording a
windfall to departing attorneys, even though both are guilty of violating
DR 2-108(A) and MRPC 5.6. Finally, allowing attorneys to use the
ethical codes for private gain by escaping their obligations under
agreements they enter into consensually violates the maxim of unclean
hands.
1. Application of the Per Se Rule Results in a Forfeiture of Law
Firms' Property
Courts recognize the probability of clients' future patronage as a
definable property interest called goodwill.99 Goodwill has been defined
as "nothing more than the probability that old customers will resort to the
old place.""' The value of goodwill inures to the firm because often the
attorney's opportunity to serve the client came about only because of the
attorney's firm affiliation.1 - Furthermore, the attorney may have
undertaken client development at significant cost to the firm. 2 The rule
99. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 152 (N.J. 1992) ("The probability of
future patronage can be translated into prospective earnings.").
100. Id. (quoting Cruttwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (1810)).
101. See Kalish, supra note 38, at 423.
102. The plaintiff in Cohen, for instance,
was allowed to spend a considerable amount of his professional time writing tax articles and
serving on committees of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section and the American
Law Institute .... As a result, he gradually established a reputation as an expert in certain areas
of practice... essentially at the firm's expense.
Affidavit of Henry Baldwin, Lord, Day & Lord executive committee chairman, quoted in Brill,
supra note 1, at 102.
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is that, unless otherwise specified, clients retain law firms and not
particular attorneys.'0 3
Application of the per se rule results in the forfeiture of a law firm's
property interest in goodwill. A forfeiture is the taking away of a pre-
existing valid right without compensation. 1' 4 Forfeitures are disfavored
both in law and equity, particularly when they are not compelled by the
express requirements of a contract.'0 5 When an attorney leaves a firm,
the firm loses anticipated income generated by clients who choose to
follow the departing attorney. In order to protect that property interest,
firms bargain for a restrictive covenant, either offsetting the loss with a
reduction in the attorney's departure compensation, or preventing it
with a client-based restriction."0 7 When courts invalidate covenants not
to compete under the per se rule, the firm's property :interest is forfeited.
As Arthur Corbin has stated with respect to a covenant not to compete
appurtenant to the sale of a business:
The reason that the buyer should be able to enforce the lawful
promises of the seller is not that he is more nearly innocent than the
seller but that the harm to the public is mostly prevented by
eliminating the illegal excess restraint, and the forfeiture resulting
from total non-enforcement would be unjust punishment.' °
Similar logic applies to a covenant not to compete appurtenant to a
lawyer's partnership or employment agreement.
103. Note, The Death of a Lawyer, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 616 (1956); see also Anthony L.
Marks, Barefoot Shoemakers: An Uncompromising Approach to Policing the Morals of the
Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 509, 529 (1987). The Model Rules and the
Model Code recognize the general rule by allowing attorneys to disclosa client confidences to other
attorneys in the firm. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983); see also Model Code
of Professional Responsibility EC 4-2 (1969).
104. Black's Law Dictionary 650 (6th ed. 1990).
105. In re Erie L. Ry., 548 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a railroad's cancellation of
an employee's retirement benefits is an invalid forfeiture absent sufficient cause occasioned by the
acts of the employee).
106. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
108. 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1524 (1962).
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2. The Per Se Rule Violates the Principle of In Par! Delicto
When firms and attorneys enter into contracts containing restrictive
covenants, both violate DR 2-108(A) and MRPC 5.6."09 Typically, suits
over attorneys' covenants not to compete arise when a departing attorney
sues a firm to obtain departure compensation that the firm has
withheld."' Under the per se rule, courts enforce the firm's obligations,
while relieving attorneys of their responsibilities under the contract. This
is contrary to the principle of in pari delicto, which suggests that when
two parties are equally in the wrong, the defendant, typically the firm,
holds the stronger position."' The per se rule, therefore, incorrectly
favors attorneys over their firms even though the misconduct by each
party is exactly the same." 2
Moreover, where the restriction is in the form of an agreement
discouraging competition, courts have uniformly voided the anti-
competitive portion of the agreement while allowing the departure
compensation to stand." 3 A contract, however, is severable only when
the performances can be divided into equivalent pairs of part
performances.' 14 When courts hold the anti-competitive portion of the
agreement invalid so that the attorney may compete but enforce the
firm's obligation to pay departure compensation, the remaining pairs of
part performances are nowhere near equal' 1 5 The per se rule therefore
violates the rule of severability.
109. Jacob v. Norris, Mclaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 155 (N.J. 1992); see supra notes
66-67 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992); Cohen v. Lord,
Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
111. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1988) (applying the principle of in pari delicto to a
violation of federal securities law).
112. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 419 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting that striking the restrictive
covenant imposes a sanction on defendant law firm while plaintiff, who also violated the rule, reaps
a substantial reward).
113. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 413; accord Jacob, 607 A.2d at 154; Hagan v. O'Connell, Goyak &
Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d 563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811
S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1991).
114. E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.8 (2d ed. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
supra note 4, § 183.
115. Voiding the entire agreement, Farnsworth concludes, is preferable to depriving one party of
the expected performance with no concession in return, where the performance sought is a material
part of the contract. Farnsworth, supra note 114, § 5.8.
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3. Application of the Per Se Rule Violates the Maxim of Unclean
Hands
The maxim of unclean hands requires that a party seeking to enforce a
contract be willing to abide by its terms.1 6 When attorneys sue firms to
collect departure compensation, this principle suggests that the attorneys
should be willing to perform their obligations to refrain from competition
before the court comes to their aid. Public policy, after all, requires that
competent parties be capable of arranging their obl:igations as they see
fit.117 The per se rule compromises this principle by relieving attorneys
of their obligations to refrain from competition with their former partners
while the firms' obligations are enforced.
Cohen illustrates the inequitable consequences of enforcing the per se
rule. Cohen and Lord Day & Lord entered into a partnership agreement
whereby Lord Day & Lord promised to pay Cohen a significant sum in
return for his promise not to compete with the firm if he left."8 Cohen
reneged on the deal. The court came to Cohen's aid, however, even
though both parties violated DR 2-108(A) when they signed the
agreement. According to the principle of in pari delicto, the court should
have refused to interfere. Cohen sought to enforce the firm's promise to
pay departure compensation, even though he was unwilling to keep his
side of the agreement. This violated the principle of unclean hands.
Finally, the court allowed Cohen to serve several of the clients he had
developed while at Lord, Day & Lord. This worked a forfeiture of the
firm's goodwill - the probability that those clients would return to the
firm for additional work. All this to comply with a rtle of legal ethics. It
is a curious result: Sometimes lawyers' ethics force them not to keep
agreements they sign.
C. Courts Apply the Per Se Rule in Name Only
Courts have proposed solutions to address the negative effects of the
per se rule. Yet the alternatives they have offered Would impact clients
in the same way that the invalid covenants not to compete did.
Furthermore, newer partnership agreements frequently work around the
116. Gibson v. Kansas City Refining Co., 32 F.2d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 1929).
117. Williston, supra note 15, § 1630 ("If there is one thing more than any other which public
policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty
of contracting, and that contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held good and
shall be enforced .... " (citation omitted)).
118. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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per se rule by leaving departure compensation to the discretion of the
remaining partners. In practice, the per se rule merely muddies the
waters while achieving none of its intended positive effects.
For instance, the Jacob court indicated it would approve a provision
that reduced a departing partner's share of firm capital by the amount of
prospective firm billings lost if a client elected to follow the departing
attorney.119 The deduction would remove the departing attorney's
economic incentive to continue to serve the client. This is exactly the
effect the Jacob court sought to avoid.12 The relationship of the
departure compensation deduction to the amount of goodwill lost by the.
firm goes to the reasonableness of the provision, not to the type of
incentive it creates for the attorney to accept representation of former
clients.
Similarly, newer partnership agreements avoid formulas and
geographic restrictions in computing a departing partner's share in the
firm, and leave the departing partner's share to be paid out over an
unspecified period to be determined by the remaining partners."' If the
departing partner takes firm clients, the remaining partners pay the
departure compensation more slowly. If, on the other hand, the departing
partner does not compete with the firm, the remaining partners accelerate
payment of the departure compensation. But the word "compete" never
appears in the agreement." And while it seems possible that these
agreements may be applied in a way that restricts a client's choice of
attorney, determining whether this has happened requires a court to do
the sort of balancing that the per se rule forbids.
A law firm could use either the restriction outlined by the Jacob court
or the unspecific agreement described above to avoid the strictures of the
per se rule. To evaluate whether a provision impermissibly discourages
an attorney from representing clients of his or her former firm, a court
must compare the reduction in departure compensation to the firm's lost
goodwill. This is exactly the type of balancing courts do when they
review the reasonableness of covenants not to compete covering other
professions.
119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
121. See Cox, supra note 3, at 13.
122. Id.
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III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE REASONABLENESS TEST
TO ATTORNEYS' COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
The per se rule's failing is apparent on its face: It does not consider
the relative weight of all the interests affected by a restrictive covenant.
The reasonableness rule, on the other hand, affords an ad hoe balancing
of the interests of all concerned. Courts should adopt the reasonableness
rule because it avoids the failings of the per se ru.le and is compatible
with the public policy encouraging clients' freedom to choose counsel.
The rule is flexible enough to take into account the special importance
of client choice while still offering a minimum of protection to both
restricted attorneys and their former firms. Firms should be able to take
reasonable measures to protect their interests, as long as those measures
do not unduly burden the restricted attorneys or limit the public's access
to legal services. And, allowing reasonable restriclive covenants avoids
the inequitable results of applying the per se rule. The reasonableness
rule enforces the parties' expectations, rather than allowing one party to
shift the costs of complying with public policy to another party.
The essence of the reasonableness rule is an hidividualized inquiry
into the circumstances of the parties to the restrictive covenant. Thus it
is impossible to say in the abstract what types of restrictive covenants are
reasonable: a restraint reasonable in one set of circumstances may be
unreasonable in the next. Nonetheless, it is possible to speculate how a
court might apply the reasonableness test to specific types of restraints.
For instance, a general prohibition on practicing :.n a given community
seems plainly unreasonable. The restriction is too broad to be related to
a legitimate firm interest. 3 For instance, it would apply whether or not
the departing attorney served any clients belonging to his or her former
firm. The restriction would apply even if the attorney practiced in a
specialized field in which his or her former firm did not. Furthermore,
the restriction would impose an undue burden by requiring the restricted
attorney to relocate in order to continue the practice of law. 24 Finally, a
general prohibition would harm the interest of the public by making an
attorney unavailable to all potential clients in the restricted area, not just
those clients who dealt with the attorney at the attorney's former firm."z
123. See supra note 9; see also Howard v. Babcock, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6006, at *32 (Dec. 6,
1993).
124. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
125. See Terry, supra note 39, at 1078 n.124.
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Financial disincentives are more flexible than general prohibitions. A
forfeiture-for-competition clause, for example, reduces the attorney's
departure compensation if the attorney competes with his former firm.126
These clauses allow the restricted attorney to decide whether competing
with his or her former firm makes economic sense. 27 Forfeiture-for-
competition clauses may also be less harmful to the public. 28 Unlike a
client-specific restriction, a forfeiture-for-competition clause will not
give a departing attorney an incentive not to serve a particular client.29
Forfeiture-for-competition clauses, however, are not ideal because they
are not narrowly tailored to protect firm interests. As with the general
prohibition, they apply whether or not the firm suffers any actual loss of
goodwill from clients who choose to follow the departing attorney.
A client-based restriction is the solution most narrowly tailored to
protect firm interests. This type of restriction reduces an attorney's
departure compensation for each client who elects to follow the departing
attorney. 3' As with a forfeiture-for-competition clause, courts could
invalidate as unreasonable a client-based restriction if the impact on the
attorney was grossly disproportionate to the loss suffered by the firm.
But a client-based restriction that reduced the attorney's departure
compensation by an amount equal to the firm's loss of goodwill may be
upheld as reasonable. Such a restriction would be no greater than
necessary to protect firm interests. It would burden the restricted
attorney only to the extent the departure caused a loss to the firm.
Finally, a client-based restriction would minimize the impact on the
public because it would potentially affect only those clients served by the
departing attorney.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts review attorneys' covenants not to compete under differing
standards. Most courts mistakenly apply DR 2-108(A) and MRPC 5.6 to
find the agreements per se invalid. There is little reason, however, to
view attorneys' covenants not to compete as any more detrimental to the
public interest than anti-competitive covenants covering other
professions. Moreover, the per se rule creates inequities between firms
126. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
127. See Howard v. Babcock, Cal. LEXIS 6006, at *18 (Dec. 6, 1993).
128. See Terry, supra note 39, at 1078 n.124.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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and attorneys because courts employing the rule ignore legitimate firm
interests. Furthermore, courts apply the per se rule in name only,
allowing agreements that are indistinguishable from reasonable
covenants not to compete. A better approach would be to view
attorneys' covenants not to compete under the :reasonableness test
applicable to restrictive covenants in all other fields. The reasonableness
test would preserve clients' freedom to choose their counsel, while
protecting legitimate firm interests. Towards this end, MRPC 5.6 and
DR 2-108 (A) of the MCPR should be amended to allow attorneys to
enter into reasonable covenants not to compete.
